In a year of resurgent prime time game shows, does anybody remember the long running "Truth or Consequences?" In the show, contestants were asked to answer a difficult question and if they failed to get the "truth," they had to perform some zany and often embarrassing stunt as a "consequence." It would seem, somehow, that Truth or Consequences is back, with all of America as the contestant, and that the war in Iraq is some awful consequence of our failure to get to the truth.
The problem is that none of the decision makers that had a stake in bringing about the second Gulf War believed how ugly the consequences of their decisions would be. Take, for example, Saddam Hussein. Saddam believed that after fighting the Iranians to a stalemate for a decade and surviving and then fighting the Americans in Gulf War I and surviving, that he could pretty much survive anything. Saddam clearly misunderstood the Bush administration's resolve to see his regime toppled and as such found himself hiding in a hole, only to face the hangman's noose a few months later. Had Saddam thought through the consequences of his continued intransigence, he might have opted for a course similar to Muammar Qaddafi, another former pariah dictator, who is suddenly not only tolerated but even cited as an example of reason in the Middle East. By giving up two of his security agents (indicted by the World Court for their role in the Lockerbie bombing), and agreeing to verifiably surrender his covert nuclear program, Qaddafi not only saved his own skin, but is now being courted by many Western companies eager to develop the resources in his country.
Similarly unaware of the consequences of their actions are those in the Bush administration who launched a very successful attack on Iraq without thinking through the aftermath. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times (who advocated the forceful overthrow of Saddam's regime) famously wrote before the war that
"if you break it, you own it," warning Americans that putting Iraq back together again was no small task. Few expected the overthrow of Saddam's regime to be as relatively easy as it was, yet the administration had clearly not thought through the consequences of "owning" Iraq following the military victory.
The Historian and journalist, Michael Oren once remarked that
"there are only 3 nation states historically in the Muslim Middle East: Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. The other nations are make-believe. The borders are arbitrary and the governments are artificial." Nowhere is this more true than in Iraq. The country we know of today as Iraq has not been a cohesive entity since the days of the Babylonian emperors who fell to the Persians (under Cyrus the Great) in 539 BC. Modern Iraq was born out of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which formally made the country a British mandate. The borders of the modern country were drawn, rather carelessly, by the British along the lines of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 with the French, whereby the former Ottoman territories were divided between the two allied powers on the assumption of victory over the Turks and their German allies. Whereas under the Turks there were three distinct provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra divided under historical, tribal, and ethnic lines, the British lumped all of these areas together and called them "Iraq."
The British hadn't clearly thought through the consequences of their actions, and when Iraq became independent in 1932, it saw a few kings from the (British installed) Hashemite line, only to see the monarchy violently deposed in the 1950's to be followed by a series of strong-men dictators, culminating in the rule of Saddam Hussein in 1979.
Having now overthrown Saddam, it would seem that many Americans are not thinking through the consequences of their actions in Iraq either. While the Bush administration clearly underestimated the difficulty of the job it would take to rebuild Iraq, his critics are similarly underestimating the chaos that would result as a consequence of our leaving. "Bring home the troops" may make for a nice slogan, but if anyone thinks the world will sit idly by as Iraq disintegrates, they are clearly ignorant of the region's history.
All of Iraq's neighbors have a large stake in the outcome of the current sectarian strife. Saudi Arabia has publicly stated that if America leaves it will "have no choice" but to support the Sunnis in their battle with the Shi'a. Iran clearly has a vested interest in supporting their Shi'a kinsmen; while Syria and Turkey -- both of whom have large Kurdish minorities -- have varied interests in any "civil war" that may result.
In fact, the very term "civil war" is something of a misnomer in describing Iraqi current events. A civil war implies fighting between fellow citizens for dominion over a nation. The violence in Iraq today is at worst tribal, and at best confessional. It is highly unlikely that any one group could claim dominion over the entire area of Iraq as the spoils of military victory. More likely, the country would disintegrate into loose confessional confederations not unlike the old Ottoman provinces.
If Americans want to understand the "truth" of what is going on in Iraq today, we must realize that we are directly responsible for bringing down the old order, and like it or not, it is now our responsibility to bring about a new order. This new order will help shape the Middle East for decades to come and is vital to our national interest. The "consequence" of our actions is that we can no more simply "bring home our troops" then we can allow Iran to control the region.
While we cannot simply exit Iraq, we are not out of options either. We might learn something from the way the Turks ran the provinces we now know as Iraq. They were once a loose confederation of locally administered provinces answerable to the Turkish Sultan. Americans do not claim dominion over Iraq and have no interest in establishing hegemony over the country. Bush has publicly claimed that he would like to see Iraqis establishing a pluralistic, Democratic country that will act as a bellwether against the spread of Islamic extremism in the region.
Perhaps one way to achieve this is to reduce the day to day friction of Western soldiers patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities. As soon as the Iraqi army and police forces are strong enough to take over the duties of security, a task they are increasingly already doing, American forces could consolidate into fortified bases responsible only for strategic threats. America can maintain order and act as a bulwark against interference by Iraq's neighbors, while Iraqis themselves begin to build their country and their institutions. Instead of insisting on a strong federal system from Baghdad, we can instead encourage a weaker federation of provincial governments much like what is happening on the ground today anyway.
The Kurds have been running a state within a state in the north since Gulf War I. The Shi'a have near autonomy in the South, while the Sunnis continue to fight because they see their privileged status from the former Iraq disappearing as the Shi'a gain increasing power in Baghdad. By giving the Sunni a provincial government of their own in the center of the country, answerable to a central Federal authority in Baghdad, we would be pragmatically restoring a system that held for hundreds of years while not tearing apart the modern Iraq.
For too long both the advocates and critics of American policy in Iraq have ignored the truth of what's been going on or the consequences of their preferred ideologies. We have too much at stake as a nation to ignore the problems we have played such a large part in creating. The best we can hope for now is to think carefully through the consequences of our decisions on the ground and begin to shape a pragmatic solution that will make the region, and by proxy the world, safer for Western style liberalism.