The Economist Magazine this week published a cover headlined "Israel's wasted victory, the six-day war, 40 years on."  The magazine summarized the extraordinary military achievements that led to Israel's pummeling of 3 Arab armies and the conquering of land 3 times larger than the pre-war state in an awe-inspiring 3 days.  The story described the incredible opportunity that this victory afforded Israel and how in 40 years that victory has been squandered, due mostly, to an inability to agree on what the state (and the region) should -- or realistically could -- look like decades later.  As I read the article I couldn't help but think that the same lessons are worth learning with regards to America and Iraq.

Those lessons can be summarized into three main categories:  1. Peace Within - That is the ability of differing groups, clans, or factions to live in peace within a governmental framework.  2.  Peace Without - The ability to live among often hostile neighbors in a relationship that is strategically prudent.  3.  Societal Peace - Marshaling the aftermath of war to better your society.

Israel believed, following 1967 that the best way to ensure "Peace Within" would be to quickly consolidate its territorial gains into the fabric of Israeli society.  Many Israelis believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that by treating the Arab residents of the conquered territories the same way Israeli Arabs were treated -- that is building Western-standard infrastructure for water, sewage, power, and schools, in areas almost completely neglected by their former Jordanian and Egyptian sovereigns -- that they would in time become Israeli.  Unlike their Arab brethren who did not flee Israel in 1948 and subsequently became Israeli citizens, the Arab populations of the newly conquered territories assumed the identity of "Palestinians" and collectively decided to resist Israel head-on in a way that their former host governments were unable to do.  Instead of building a "Peace Within" by lavishly spending on infrastructure and connecting Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights into Israel, the Israelis unwittingly created an enemy within that (like Hamas threatens almost daily) would like nothing better than to destroy it.

Similarly, by deposing the unpopular dictator Saddam Hussein, the United States believed that it could achieve "Peace Within" Iraq by providing a democratic voice to the disparate Sunni, Shia, and Kurds of Iraq.  The war planners believed -- naively -- that by empowering political expression, Iraqis could accept peaceful coexistence.  Instead, the major religious factions began looking at nation-building as something of a Zero-sum-game.  That is, any gains for one's religious or political rival is a loss for one's own ambitions.  This infighting quickly spiraled into armed conflict with local or religious militias vastly outmaneuvering the nascent Iraqi army and police forces.  What was to be a peaceful and democratic country is devolving into three separate entities based loosely on religious affiliation, only one of which (the Kurds) is particularly friendly to the US.

No less important than building a "Peace from Within" is "ensuring Peace from Without."  War is fundamentally about protecting yourself from your enemies.  In the aftermath of the six-day war Israel had achieved "strategic depth" of territory that it could not imagine before the war and for the first time in its short 19 year history breathed a collective sigh of relief that it was no longer in existential peril.  The reality, however, was that Israel's strategic problem was not only in its territorial depth, but rather in its demographic minuteness.  A small country of 5.5 million Jews, surrounded by over 300 million Arabs sworn to your destruction is necessarily a ticking-bomb waiting to explode.  Israel's best hope for a Peaceful and prosperous future was and is to negotiate Peace with its neighbors.  Following their losses in the Six-Day war (in Arabic "an-Naksah," the setback), the defeated Arab governments were so humiliated that they were in no position to talk peace of any kind with the Israelis.

Far from being a setback to America's enemies, the victory in Iraq provided a golden opportunity for Syria and Iran to strengthen themselves by entangling the US in an ever deepening Iraqi morass.   A strong, democratic Iraq would serve as an extremely dangerous foil to the theocratic Iranians or the autocratic Syrians.  Both countries fear their own populations and neither can afford the inevitable democratic murmurs that would result from a successful Arab Democracy right across their borders.  The US had an opportunity in the momentary euphoria following its deposition of Saddam to clean things up, to remove the massive stockpiles of weapons, and to seal the borders in an attempt to prevent the infiltration of foreign agents and jihadists.  Mistakenly believing that Iraqis of all kinds would welcome America as their liberators and sit down together to draw up a successful form of government, the US missed this opportunity and found itself fighting an increasingly intransigent insurgency as well as defending itself from an ever more belligerent Iran.

Besides the internal forces shaping conquered populations and the external forces shaping new geo-political realities are the more subtle forces facing the victors themselves, the "Societal Peace."  In the aftermath of 1967 Israelis began to see themselves not as cornered underdogs, but rather as hardened warriors willing and able to take care of themselves.  While this transformation was welcome, indeed desired by fervent Zionists, the role of "occupier" was certainly an unwelcome consequence of the war.  The Israelis, like the Americans in Iraq, saw themselves as benevolent rulers, truly hoping to build institutions of peace and live side by side with the Arab populations in their midst’s.  It was not until the first intifada (uprising) in 1987 that most Israelis understood that the Palestinians had no desire whatsoever to live under Israeli rule.  It was one thing to defend yourself against Arab terror, it was quite another to police a hostile population in your midst.  Rather than unite Israelis, this harsh reality became a wedge in Israeli society that still divides the country.

Iraqis face a far different and even more profound societal dilemma:  "What does it mean to be Iraqi?"  For that matter, is that identity even worth defending?  The United States has the advantage of being half a world away from Iraq.  Unlike the Israelis who are fighting in their own back yards, the Americans can and will one day return home.  George Bush set the extremely lofty goal of building the first vibrant, pluralistic Democracy in the Arab Middle East.  The Iraqis however, lacking the social institutions, and historical background for a cohesive pluralistic society are devolving back into the tribal affiliations that existed before the British thrust upon them the identity of "Iraq" following World War I.  For Iraq, "societal peace" means first and foremost putting the loyalty to one's clan or religion behind the loyalty to a united federal government, a goal that seems to be getting further and further away.

It is much easier to focus and analyze the results of war and victory through the lens of history.  Seeing clearly, and making the right decisions at the time, through the fog of war, is a much trickier prospect.  Wars, however, tend to be nasty and always have consequences that we need to be mindful of.  It is too late for Israel to create a peace of its choosing based on the victory of the Six-Day war and it is too late for the US to create a peace of its choosing based on the victory over Saddam Hussein.  It is not too late, however to create peace on both fronts, however that peace will come at a significantly higher cost. 

What is needed most now is a vision for the future more than for the present.  The outline of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been in the offing.  Bill Clinton got deceptively close before leaving office in 2000, and subsequent suggestions have all looked extremely similar.  What has always been missing has been strong leadership able to sell the necessary compromises to increasingly skeptical populations.  Strength in leadership is also sorely missing in Iraq.  The weak government is being challenged by well financed and well armed groups doing the bidding of hostile foreign powers who have a large stake in keeping just the right level of chaos in Iraq without letting that chaos spill over the borders.  They know that if America can be kept occupied playing policeman that they just might be able to get away with the incredible repression of their own populations.

One thing is clear, however:  If the urge to bury our heads in the sand prevails and America withdraws from Iraq, as many in the US are now urging, we will be making the same mistake Israel made following 1967.  We will be choosing the easy route thinking that our work is done when it is really just beginning.  Stabilizing and shaping Iraq will not be easy but the future dividends of a stable Democracy in the heart of the Middle East will be well worth our while.  This is precisely why countries such as Iran are fighting so hard to make sure that does not happen.  Let's make sure that 40 years from now we don't see headlines that read "America's Wasted Victory."